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Abstract
This paper examines the incentives for a party leader in o¢ ce and for
a parties rank-and-le to replace a sitting member of parliament. As to
the leaders decision, we show that the leader prefers to replace a critical
member of parliament who votes against the leaders policy. A competent
leader designing e¢ cient policies replaces a critical member since the member
is unable to evaluate policies. A critical member may also have discovered a
policy failure if the leader designs ine¢ cient policies. In that case, the leader
infers that the critical member has the ability to learn the quality of policies.
An incompetent leader who cares about his reputation rather prefers that
the member of parliament is incompetent. To reduce the risk that a future
policy failure is discovered, an incompetent leader therefore replaces a critical
member and keeps a member who supports the ine¢ cient policy.
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1 Introduction
O¢ ce holders may continue pursuing a policy even if they know that the policy is
not in the public interest. One reason may be that the executive cares about his
reputation of being competent (see e.g. Dur, 2001, Chiu, 2002, Beniers and Dur,
2004, Majumdar and Mukand, 2004). To protect society for an ine¢ cient project,
implementation therefore normally requires the support of a majority of parliament.
Members of parliament are expected to evaluate the pros and cons of projects and to
vote on their implementation. Hence, the ability of parliamentarians to evaluate the
consequences of policies is likely to have a major impact on the quality of government
decision making.
Although voters elect the members of parliament, the set of candidates is to a
large extent predetermined inside the distinct parties. Each party decides before
the elections which members are allowed to stand for parliament. Moreover, under
proportional elections the position of each candidate on the party list a¤ects the
candidatesprobability of obtaining a legislative seat.1 Particularly, if lists are closed
the electorate only determines the distribution of seats among the parties. The order
of the party list is decided on by means of the partiescandidate selection process.
O¢ ce holders may exert inuence on the candidate selection process, especially if
an o¢ ce holder is also the leader of the party. The extent to which an o¢ ce holder
can a¤ect the composition of parliament depends on the internal organization of the
party.
Political scientists show that parties vary signicantly in the organization of their
candidate selection process.2 Lundell (2004) classies for a large number of parties
the degree of centralization of the candidate selection process. In some parties,
mainly in the Nordic countries, ordinary members of the party are allowed to decide
on the list. Other parties in e.g. Israel, Italy, and Spain exhibit a more centralized
structure in which the party leader or a special committee makes up the list. This
raises the question how party governance a¤ects the selection and functioning of
1Proportional elections can be found in many, mainly European, countries among others in
Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain. In Germany, there is a mixed system in which one
half of the parliament is elected using party lists while the other half is elected by majority rule in
several districts. An overview of electoral systems is given in Lijphart (1994).
2See, for instance, Pennings and Hazan (2001) and subsequent papers in the special issue on
candidate selection of Party Politics, 2001 7(3).
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parliament. Persson and Tabellini (2003, p. 21) state that if lists are drawn up
by party leaders (as is commonly the case), the ranking is likely to reect criteria
unrelated to competence in providing benets to voters, such as party loyalty or
e¤ort within the party. Empirical evidence suggests that centralized parties impose
party discipline inducing members of parliament to support the partiesplatform.3
Party discipline seems to be in conict with the task of parliament to control the
government. Particularly, this may result in ine¢ cient decisions if the party in o¢ ce
constitutes a majority in parliament, su¢ cient to implement policies.4
The main objective of this paper is to examine the incentives to replace a sitting
member of parliament. We compare a situation in which the leader in o¢ ce is
entitled to replace the member with a situation in which the rank-and-le of the
party decides on replacement. We show under which conditions the replacement
decision of the leader is not optimal from the societys point of view. We develop
a simple two-period model with the same leader in o¢ ce in each period. In every
period, the leader designs one policy which is either good or bad. A competent
leader designs good policies while an incompetent leader designs bad policies. The
leader knows the quality of the policies. Implementing a policy requires the support
of the member of parliament who receives a private signal about the policys quality.
We consider a situation in which the member responds to his signal and prefers to
implement only good policies. A competent member always receives a correct signal
while an incompetent members signal is correct only by chance. At the end of
period 1, the rank-and-le or the leader decides on replacing the member active in
period 1 with a new member. The rank-and-le does not observe the quality of the
policies. The rank-and-les objectives are assumed to be in line with the public
interest. The leader is either an idealist, caring about the public interest, or an
opportunist, caring about his reputation of being competent. An idealistic leader
is assumed to be competent whereas an opportunistic leader is either competent or
3See Bowler, Farell and Katz (1999) and Kam (2001). Hix (2004) shows that members of
the European Parliament vote more in line with the preferences of their national party when
the electoral system is more party centered (such as proportional elections) and the selection of
candidates is centralized. Recently, Grossman and Helpman (2005) examine how the level of local
public spending depends on party discipline.
4In a parliamentary system, the party or parties in o¢ ce normally constitute a majority in
parliament. By contrast, in a presidential system the leader in o¢ ce (the president) and the
members of parliament are elected separately. As a result, the leader in o¢ ce may be a¢ liated
with a di¤erent party than the majority in parliament (divided government).
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incompetent. The leaders ability and motivation are private information.
We show that the leader replaces the member only if the member does not sup-
port the leaders policy. In other words, critical parliamentarians are replaced. The
intuition is as follows. A critical member of parliament received negative inform-
ation about the leaders policy. Consequently, a leader who designs good policies
infers that a critical member is incompetent. The leader knows that an incompetent
member may vote against good policies. An idealistic as well as an opportunistic
leader prefers that a good policy is implemented. The former because implementa-
tion is in the public interest, the latter since implementation improves the leaders
reputation. Hence, a competent leader replaces a critical member of parliament. A
leader may also be incompetent designing ine¢ cient policies. In that case, a critical
parliamentarian received the correct information and is most likely competent. A
competent member is more likely to discover a policy failure than an incompetent
member. Reputational concerns therefore induce an incompetent leader to replace
a critical member. Along the same lines, we show that a leader always keeps a
member who supports the leaders policy. A competent leader keeps a loyal member
since the member is most likely competent. An incompetent leader prefers a loyal
member because the member is unable to evaluate policies.
A centralized party structure thus implies that loyal members are not replaced
and critical members are replaced. By contrast, we show that the rank-and-le
prefers to replace the member independent of his vote, to reduce the risk of a wrong
decision in period 2. The likelihood of a wrong decision is lower with two di¤erent
members than with one member present in both periods. From the societiespoint of
view, the leader is thus too conservative in replacing sitting members of parliament.
We would therefore expect a higher turnover of parliamentarians if the selection
process becomes more decentralized. Empirical observations from the Netherlands
seem to be in line with this expectation. We calculated the turnover rate for the
three major political parties in the Netherlands after each election since 1952 by
using information on the composition of the Dutch parliament. We found that
especially over time there are signicant changes. The average turnover rate of
parliamentarians after an election rose from about 25% in the fties to almost 60%
after the 2003 elections. This increase in legislative turnover is partially due to
stronger electoral uctuations. However, controlling for electoral volatility we still
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nd that mainly in the sixties and in the last decade sitting members of parliament
are replaced more often than before (see Figure 1 and 2 in the Appendix). At the
same time, parties changed the organization of their candidate selection process.
Especially in the sixties, party members called for more inuence on the composition
of the party list. Nowadays, almost all parties in the Netherlands exhibit a more
decentralized selection process than in the 1950s (Katz and Maier, 1992, Koole,
1992). This trend towards decentralized candidate selection processes is observed
in several European countries (Bille, 2001). In a decentralized party, members of
parliament who support the party leader may be more easily replaced than if the
leader can exert inuence on the list.5
The set-up of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature related to
this paper. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 examines the selection of the
member of parliament for a decentralized party. Section 5 examines the incentives
of the leader to replace the member. Section 6 compares the two governance forms.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The internal functioning of political parties in selecting and motivating politicians
has received little attention from economists so far. Recently, Caillaud and Tirole
(1999, 2002) provide a rst analysis of the use of intra-party competition to motivate
the leader of the party. Caillaud and Tirole (1999) examine how the possibility for
a partiesrank-and-le to overrule the leaders policy a¤ects the incentive to design
high quality policies. Policies di¤er both in quality and in policy position. As
leaders are o¢ ce oriented, they design policies in line with the median voters policy
preferences. The rank-and-le may propose a di¤erent policy by overruling the
leader. However, overruling comes at a cost since the rank-and-le never designs
a high quality policy. Consequently, there is no incentive to overrule in a centrist
5Matland and Studlar (2004) nd that legislative turnover is signicantly higher under pro-
portional elections than under majoritarian elections. One reason for this may be that under
majoritarian elections legislators have a stronger incentive to acquire a so-called "personal vote",
see Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987) and Carey and Shugart (1995). Parties may be reluctant
to replace an incumbent legislator who attracts many voters. Matland and Studlar do not exam-
ine how changes in a partiesgovernance structure a¤ects the turnover rate over time for a given
electoral system.
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party since there the leader designs policies in line with the preferences of the rank-
and-le. As a result, the incentive for the leader of a centrist party to design a high
quality policy is low reducing the partieselectoral chances.
Caillaud and Tirole (2002) show that intra-party competition for the position
of the leader (primaries) may increase the candidates incentives to design good
projects. The reason is that uninformed voters infer that the candidates designed a
good project when both candidates propose the same project (internal validation). A
primary therefore increases the returns to exerting e¤ort in designing the single good
project. However, intra-party competition discourages the candidates to exert e¤ort
when the quality of projects is publicly revealed with a large probability (external
validation). In that case, designing the good policy results almost immediately in
an electoral success in a hierarchical party whereas an additional hurdle has to be
taken in a party using primaries. Castanheira, Crutzen and Sahuguet (2004) build
on Caillaud and Tirole (2002) examining how the internal organization of a party
depends on the governance structure selected by the other party running for o¢ ce.
They show that the rank-and-le uses primaries to select the leader if inter-party
competition is low. In Crutzen (2004), the rank-and-le can discipline legislators
by using the party list. Crutzen shows that if the order of the list depends on
politicians behavior, rent extraction may be higher under majoritarian elections
than under proportional elections, in contrast with Persson and Tabellini (2000).
Our paper di¤ers from Caillaud and Tirole (1999, 2002) and from Crutzen (2004)
in several respects. Most importantly, in our paper the replacement decision does
not work as a disciplining device but rather as a selection device. We compare
the selection of parliamentarians who di¤er in ability for di¤erent party governance
structures. The party leader has an informational advantage over the consequences
of the policies. As a consequence, an idealistic as well as an opportunistic leader
replaces the member if a new member is more likely to support implementation.
Carrillo and Mariotti (2001) also study a partiesincentive to replace incumbent
politicians. They show that voters prefer to replace incumbents more often than
the two competing parties. This stems from the fact that each party cares only
about beating the candidate of the other party during the elections. By contrast,
voters prefer to select the candidate with the highest expected ability. Voters learn
about the ability of a candidate through his campaign performance. The ability of
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a new candidate is surrounded by a higher degree of uncertainty than the ability of
an incumbent politician. As a result, the probability of electing at least one high
qualied politician is larger with two new candidates than when two mediocre in-
cumbents are not replaced. Carrillo and Mariotti thus show that a partiesturnover
rate may be too low from the societiespoint of view, like in our paper. In our
paper, however, the di¤erence in replacement strategies stems from the information
asymmetry about the e¤ects of policies.
Indridason (2003) shows that the electoral chances of a party may improve if a
parliamentarian votes against the leader in o¢ ce. In that paper, each member of
parliament represents a district with distinct policy preferences which are unknown
to the leader in o¢ ce. As voting against the o¢ ce holders policy is assumed to be
costly, dissent is a credible signal about the preferences of the members district.
This enables the o¢ ce holder to design policies more in line with the interest of the
districts electorate. In our paper, voting against the leaders policy may also be
in the public interest since the policy may be ine¢ cient. The reason that critical
parliamentarians are replaced is not due to conicting policy preferences within a
party but stems from the selection of members on the basis of their ability.
In our paper, the leader can exert inuence on the members voting behavior
in period 2 by replacing critical members. This may lead to ine¢ cient selection of
parliamentarians. Some papers show that the ability of political parties to exert in-
uence on their membersvoting behavior is a rationale for the existence of the party.
For instance, in Snyder and Ting (2002) there are costs of joining a party which are
increasing in the distance between a candidates ideal platform and the platform of
the party. As joining is costly, Snyder and Ting show that parties enable candidates
to credibly signal their preferences to the voters. In Levy (2004) organizing into a
party enables candidates with di¤erent policy preferences to reach a compromise on
a policy platform. A party thus works as a commitment device towards voters since
policy promises are not credible if a candidate operates independently.
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3 The Model
The rationale for the existence of parliament is that the leader in o¢ ce may design
a project detrimental to the public interest. To protect society for such a project,
implementation of a project requires the support of parliament. We focus on how
political parties select their members of parliament given that members may di¤er
in their ability. The internal organization of the party determines which player is
entitled to replace a member of parliament. We compare a centralized organization,
in which the leader in o¢ ce may replace a member, with a decentralized structure
in which the rank-and-le decides on replacement.
3.1 Polity
We consider a two-period model. In both periods, the same leader is in o¢ ce. In
each period, this leader designs one policy yt, where t 2 f1; 2g. A policy lasts for one
period. The leader is either competent or incompetent. A competent leader designs
good policies whereas an incompetent leader designs bad policies. The leader knows
his own ability. All other players have a prior belief about the competence of the
leader denoted by .
Implementation of a policy requires the support of parliament. In our model,
parliament is represented by a single member. This member MP decides on the
implementation of yt. TheMP in period t receives a private signal st 2 fg; bg which
may contain information about the quality of yt. The signal st = g says that yt is
good, while the signal st = b says that yt is bad. When the MP is competent, his
signal is correct: st = g if and only if yt is good. When the MP is incompetent, his
signal says that yt is good or bad both with probability 12 : Pr (st = g j yt = good) =
1
2
. The ability of an MP is unknown to all players including the MP himself. The
prior belief that an MP is competent is denoted by . The posterior beliefs about
the competence of the leader and of an MP are denoted by ^ and ^, respectively.
After receiving the private signal, the MP votes in favor of or against imple-
mentation of yt, vt 2 fY;Ng. If a good policy yt is implemented, the benet for
the public in period t is G > 0. Implementing a bad policy yt implies a cost for
the public denoted by B > 0. The payo¤ to the public in period t is normalized
to zero if no policy is implemented. Note that the payo¤ of an implemented policy
8
is not observable to the public. In the analysis, we distinguish two cases. One in
which the expected benets of implementing a policy without further information
are positive: G   (1   )B  0, and one in which the expected benets without
receiving a signal are negative: G  (1  )B < 0.
3.2 Party organization
At the end of period 1, there is a possibility to replace the member from the rst
period MP1 with a new member MP2. The internal organization of the party de-
termines which player is entitled to make the replacement decision. In a centralized
party, the leader is allowed to replace MP1. In a decentralized party, the rank-
and-le of the party, represented by a single player RF , decides whether MP1 is
replaced.6
3.3 Politiciansobjectives
We assume that the leader is either an idealist or an opportunist. An idealistic leader
acts in the public interest. An opportunistic leader cares about his reputation of
being competent. More precisely, an opportunistic leader maximizes the belief the
public holds about his competence at the end of period 2.7 The public is informed
about the implementation decision on y1 and y2 and about the internal organization
of the party. The public does not observe the replacement decision but takes into
account under which conditions MP1 is replaced. In the conclusions, we discuss the
implications of relaxing this assumption.
For simplicity, we assume that an idealistic leader is always competent. The
analysis does not change when an idealistic leader may be incompetent. The reason
is that an incompetent idealist has no incentive to design a policy. An incompetent
leader is thus always an opportunist while a competent leader is either an idealist
or an opportunist. The motivation of the leader is private information. The prior
belief that a competent leader is an opportunist is denoted by w. The rank-and-le
of the party cares about the public interest. Table 1 summarizes the game.
6We abstract from the possibility to replace the leader after period 1. See the conclusions for a
further discussion on this.
7An opportunistic leader may, for instance, care about the wage after he left politics, which
depends positively on perceived ability.
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Table 1: Overview of the game
Players: leader in o¢ ce, members MP1 and MP2, rank-and-le RF .
Timing:
Period 1
 Nature chooses the type (ability and motivation) of each player.
 The leader designs y1.
 MP1 receives a signal about the quality of y1.
 MP1 votes on implementing y1.
 The leader (centralized party) or RF (decentralized party) decide whether to
replace MP1.
Period 2
 The leader designs y2.
 MP1 or MP2 receives a signal about the quality of y2.
 MP1 or MP2 votes on implementing y2.
Payo¤s
 Benets to the public in period t: G > 0 if a good policy yt is implemented,
 B < 0 if a bad policy yt is implemented, 0 if no policy is implemented.
3.4 Denition of equilibrium
The model discussed above denes a game for each governance structure. If the party
is organized decentrally, there is a game between the rank-and-le and the member
of parliament in each period. Section 4 presents a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of
this game. In such an equilibrium neither player has an incentive to deviate from
his equilibrium strategy, given the strategies of all other players. Beliefs are formed
using Bayes rule. If the party is organized centrally, there is a game between
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the leader and the members of parliament. Section 5 derives a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium of this game. In Section 6, we compare the outcomes of each game and
examine the conditions under which the replacement decision of the leader is in the
public interest.
There exist more than one equilibrium in each of these games. We focus on
equilibria in which the member of parliament responds to information. The following
assumption ensures an active role for parliament in each period.
Assumption 1:  
G (1 )BG+(1 )B 
Assumption 1 says that a member is competent with a su¢ ciently high probab-
ility. As a result, a private signal leads an MP to respond to his signal in period 1
and 2. If Assumption 1 were violated, parliament would be redundant and selection
would not play a role.
4 Decentralized party
In this section, we discuss an equilibrium of the game in which the RF takes the
replacement decision. To ensure a time consistent solution, the game is solved by
backward induction. Initially, assume that the ex ante benets of implementing a
policy without receiving a signal are negative: G   (1   )B < 0. At the end of
this section, we discuss the results if we assume that G  (1  )B  0.
4.1 Period 2
Suppose that in period 1 MP1 votes in line with his signal. That is v1 = Y if
and only if s1 = g. In Subsection 4.3 we identify under which condition this is a
best response. Furthermore suppose that the RF has kept MP1. Now consider the
voting behavior of MP1 in period 2.
By assumption, y2 yields G if and only if y1 is good. That is, a competent
leader always designs a good project, and an incompetent leader always designs a
bad project. This feature of the model has direct implications for the information
MP1 can infer from the signals known in period 2. MP1s posterior beliefs about
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the competence of the leader, conditional on s1 and s2, are:










b (s1 = g; s2 = b) =  (1)b (s1 = b; s2 = g) = 
b (s1 = b; s2 = b) = " (1  )14
(1  )1
4
+ (1  ) + (1  )1
4
# < :
Equation (1) shows that two positive signals increase the probability that the leader
is competent, whereas two negative signals decrease the probability that the leader
is competent. Two opposite signals cancel each other out. The reason is that s1 6= s2
imply thatMP1 is not competent. A competentMP1 receives the same signal on y2
as on y1, since the two policies are of the same quality. The signals of an incompetent
MP1 do not contain information, so that b (s1 6= s2) = . In conjunction with our
assumption that G  (1  )B < 0, (1) implies that if s1 = b, it is always optimal
for MP1 to vote against implementation, v2 = N . Likewise, if s1 = g and s2 = b
MP1 votes v2 = N . Suppose s1 = s2 = g. In that case, MP1 votes v2 = Y if:
b (s1 = g; s2 = g)G  [1  b (s1 = g; s2 = g)]B  0:
This requires that  is su¢ ciently high. As we assumed an environment in which
the member of parliament responds to information (Assumption 1), this condition
hold. Hence, if RF has kept MP1 in period 2, the policy y2 is implemented if and
only if the signal set is fs1 = g; s2 = gg.
Now suppose that the RF has replacedMP1 so thatMP2 represents parliament
in period 2. From the implementation decision on y1,MP2 can infer the signalMP1
has received in period 1. Consequently, MP2 can base his vote decision on fs1; s2g.
Two conicting signals imply that at least oneMP is incompetent. AsMP2 does not
know whichMP is incompetent, again the signals cancel out. Therefore,MP2 votes
v2 = Y if the signals set is fs1 = g; s2 = gg provided that the signals are su¢ ciently
informative. The incentive to vote v2 = Y with s1 = s2 = g is stronger for MP2
than forMP1. The reason is that the probability that y2 is good is higher when two
members receive one good signal than whenMP1 receives two good signals. Lemma
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1 summarizes the voting behavior in period 2.
Lemma 1 Suppose G  (1  )B < 0. Then, in period 2 the MP votes in favor
of y2 if and only if the signal set is fs1 = g; s2 = gg.
4.2 Replacement decision
Lemma 1 implies that the replacement decision is only relevant if s1 = g. If s1 = b,
then both MP1 and MP2 prefer to vote v2 = N . Therefore, suppose that s1 = g.
Replacing MP1 yields an expected payo¤ to the RF equal to:
b (s1 = g) + (1  ) 1
2

G  [1  b (s1 = g)] (1  ) 1
2
B (2)










The likelihood that a good project will be implemented equals the probability that
the leader is competent, conditional on s1 = g, times the probability that MP2
receives signal s2 = g. The rst term of (2) denotes this. Implementation of a
bad project requires that both the leader and MP2 are incompetent, and that MP2
receives signal s2 = g. This is denoted by the second term of (2).
Keeping MP1 yields an expected payo¤ to the RF equal to:
^(s1 = g)G  [1  b (s1 = g)] 1
2
B +
hb (s1 = g)  ^(s1 = g)i 1
2
G (3)










To understand (3), notice that with s1 = g there are three possible situations in
period 2. First,MP1 and the leader are both competent. This situation occurs with
probability ^(s1 = g). Then, the good policy y2 is always implemented (rst term).
Second, the leader and MP1 are both incompetent. This occurs with probability
1  b (s1 = g). In that situation, the bad policy y2 is implemented with probability
1
2
(second term). Finally, with probability b (s1 = g)   ^(s1 = g) the leader is
competent whileMP1 is incompetent. Then y2 is also implemented with probability
1
2
(third term). When s1 = g, it is not possible that MP1 is competent while the
leader is incompetent.
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A comparison between (2) and (3) leads to the main result of this section.
Proposition 1 Suppose Lemma 1 holds. Then, always replacing MP1 is a best
response for the RF .
Proof. See the Appendix.
To understand Proposition 1, notice that keeping MP1 would amount to letting
the same member to evaluate the same leader twice. The probability that a single
member is competent is lower than the probability that one out of two members
is competent. Therefore, the probability that one member makes a mistake twice
exceeds the probability that two independent members make the same mistake. As
a result, replacingMP1 reduces the risk that a bad policy is implemented. In period
2, RF wants a fresh view on the leaders policy.
4.3 Period 1
So far we have assumed that in period 1MP1 votes in line with his signal. Let us now
check whether this is a best response. Our assumption that G   (1  )B < 0
implies that without further information about the project, the MP prefers the
status quo. Hence, s1 = b induces MP1 to vote v1 = N . Thus, what matters is if
s1 = g leadsMP1 to vote v1 = Y . Suppose s1 = g. A su¢ cient condition to support
y1 is that the policy yields a positive payo¤ in period 1:
^ (s1 = g)G  [1  ^(s1 = g)]B  0: (4)
This condition is satised given the assumption that  is su¢ ciently high.
4.4 Results if G  (1  )B  0
The analysis of the case in which G   (1   )B  0 is analogous to the ana-
lysis above. In that case, y2 is not implemented if and only if the signal set is
fs1 = b; s2 = bg. In period 1, MP1 follows his signal. When MP1 receives s1 = b
and votes against y1, he is replaced. Again the reason is that replacement lowers
the probability of a wrong decision. Now replacement reduces the risk that a good
policy is not implemented. Concluding, RF benets from replacing MP1 in either
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case. This is because two signals received by one member are correlated. In the
proof of Proposition 1, we formally derive the replacement decision in each case. In
the next section, we consider the replacement decision in a centralized party.
5 Centralized party
In this section, we discuss an equilibrium of the game in which the leader takes the
replacement decision. Again we solve the model by backward induction. Again we
rst consider the case that G  (1 )B < 0. At the end of the section, we discuss
the other case.
5.1 Period 2
The analysis of period 2 is the same as in the previous section. For this reason, we
only summarize the results of period 2. Suppose MP1 votes in line with his signal
in period 1. When MP1 is not replaced, the posterior beliefs about the competence
of the leader are again denoted by (1). From (1), we know that two opposite signals
cancel out. As a result, y2 is implemented if and only if s1 = s2 = g given Assumption
1. If MP1 is replaced, two opposite signals cancel out as only one signal is correct.
Therefore, MP2 supports y2 only if s1 = s2 = g. Hence, Lemma 1 also summarizes
the MPs voting behavior in period 2 if the party is centralized.
5.2 Replacement decision
The replacement decision is only relevant if s1 = g. Suppose s1 = g. Contrary
to the rank-and-le, the leader knows the quality of y1. As a result, the leaders
posterior belief about the competence ofMP1 is di¤erent than the posterior belief of
RF about MP1. Let us now discuss the incentive for each type of leader to replace
MP1.
Suppose the leader is an idealist designing good policies. Consequently, it is in
the public interest when y2 is implemented. Implementation requires that s2 = g.
A competent MP receives s2 = g more often than an incompetent MP given that
y2 is good. Therefore, the leader does not replace MP1 if MP1 is competent with
a higher probability than MP2. The leaders posterior belief about the competence
15
of MP1 given v1 = Y is denoted by:





The posterior belief thatMP1 is competent increases since the member received the
correct information. An idealistic leader thus keeps MP1 if v1 = Y to enhance the
probability that y2 is implemented.
Suppose the leader is an opportunist and competent. An opportunistic leader
does not care about the public interest, but cares about his reputation of being
competent. In equilibrium, the public knows that y2 is implemented only if s2 = g.
Moreover, suppose that the public beliefs that MP1 is not replaced if v1 = Y . The







where ^ is denoted by (5) and ^ >  is denoted by (1). The reputation of the leader
improves if y2 is implemented. If y2 is not implemented, the public believes that the
signal set is fs1 = g; s2 = bg. Then the two conicting signals cancel out and the
posterior belief about the leaders competence is equal to the prior. The expected







As replacement is not observable, the posterior beliefs about the competence of the
leader are the same as in (6). However, the probability that y2 is implemented
depends on whether MP1 is replaced. Keeping MP1 is optimal if condition (6) >
(7). This is always satised. The reason is simple. Implementation of y2 improves
the reputation of the leader. A competent member supports the implementation of
a good policy more often than an incompetent member. MP1 is competent with
a higher probability than MP2 since MP1 received the correct signal in period 1.
Consequently, alike an idealistic leader, an opportunistic and competent leader has
no incentive to replace MP1 if v1 = Y .
Finally, suppose the leader is incompetent. Along the same lines as above, the
opportunistic leader maximizes the probability that y2 is implemented. The leader
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knows, however, that y2 is bad. A bad policy may only be implemented in case the
member is incompetent. From v1 = Y , the leader infers that MP1 is incompetent,b(s1 = g j y1 = bad) = 0. The incompetent leader therefore does not replace MP1
if v1 = Y since an incompetent member may fail in screening y2. Reputational
concerns induce a leader to keep an incompetent parliamentarian.
5.3 Period 1
In period 1, MP1 votes v1 = N if s1 = b given that G   (1   )B < 0. Suppose
MP1 receives s1 = g. If MP1 votes in favor of y1, he is not replaced. However,
there is also no reason for the leader to replace MP1 if v1 = N . In that case, the
leader beliefs that s1 = b and that y2 is never implemented. As a consequence, MP1
supports y1 if condition (4) holds.
5.4 Results if G  (1  )B  0
Now consider the other case in which G  (1 )B  0. In that case, the policy y2
is always implemented if v1 = Y . If v1 = N , implementation of y2 requires s2 = g.
The replacement decision is therefore only relevant if v1 = N . As above, an idealistic
as well as an opportunistic leader replace MP1 if this increases the probability that
y2 is implemented. This desire for implementation induces the leader to replace
MP1 if v1 = N . When the leader designs good policies, MP1 is incompetent if
v1 = N . As a result, replacing MP1 is optimal as MP2 discovers more often that y2
is good. When the leader designs bad policies, the leaders posterior belief about the
competence of MP1 increases if v1 = N . However, implementation of a bad policy
may happen only if the member is incompetent. An incompetent leader therefore
replaces a competent but critical parliamentarian to prevent that a future policy
failure is also discovered. In period 1, MP1 follows his signal given Assumption 1.
The following proposition summarizes the replacement strategy of the leader for
the cases in which replacement is relevant.
Proposition 2 The leader strictly prefers not to replace MP1 if v1 = Y and G 
(1  )B < 0 and to replace MP1 if v1 = N and G  (1  )B  0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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Proposition 2 says that in a centralized party there is an incentive to keep a mem-
ber who supports the leaders policy and to replace a member who votes against the
policy. Each type of leader prefers to increase the probability that y2 is implemen-
ted. As a result, the leader selects members on the basis of their competence given
the leaders own ability. When the leader designs good policies, he prefers a com-
petent parliament. When the leader designs bad policies, he prefers an incompetent
parliament. An incapable leader therefore either keeps a loyal incompetent MP
or replaces a critical competent MP .8 In the previous section, we showed that the
rank-and-le selects a new member to obtain additional information about the qual-
ity of the second period policy. Let us now compare the selection of parliamentarians
for the two governance forms.
6 Comparison
So far, we derived the selection of the member of parliament in period 2 for a
centralized party and for a decentralized party. By assumption, the preferences of the
RF are exactly in line with the public interest. The objectives of the leader, however,
may conict with the public interest. This raises the question whether a centralized
candidate selection process is optimal from the societiespoint of view. Therefore,
suppose that RF may select a governance structure at the beginning of period
1. RF compares the expected payo¤ of policies implemented under a centralized
party structure with those implemented under a decentralized structure. The voting
behavior of MP1 and MP2 does not depend on the governance structure. However,
the replacement strategy of the leader may be di¤erent than the replacement strategy
of RF . As a result, the expected benets of policies implemented in period 2 may
depend on the governance structure.
The replacement strategy of the leader and RF coincides if G  (1  )B  0.
In that case, the leader and the RF benet from replacing MP1 if v1 = N . The
leader prefers a new member to enhance the probability that y2 is implemented.
8In our model, a competent leader always designs a good policy while an incompetent leader
always designs a bad policy. The replacement strategy of the leader does not change when a
competent leader occasionally designs a bad policy and an incompetent leader sometimes designs
a good policy. As long as the probability that y2 is good (bad) increases su¢ ciently if y1 is good
(bad), a competent leader prefers a competent member while an incompetent leader prefers an
incompetent member.
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The rank-and-le prefers a new member to reduce the risk of a wrong decision in
period 2. As a consequence, the rank-and-le is indi¤erent between a centralized
and a decentralized party structure if G  (1  )B  0.
The replacement strategies conict, however, if G   (1   )B < 0. In this
case, the leader prefers to keep MP1 if v1 = Y . The reason is that MP1 supports
implementation of y2 more often than MP2 given v1 = Y . However, RF prefers a
new member to reduce the risk that a bad policy y2 is implemented. ReplacingMP1
if v1 = Y is therefore in the public interest. In this case, a centralized party thus
deteriorates the selection of parliamentarians and decreases the expected benets of
period 2. As a consequence, the rank-and-le prefers a decentralized party organiz-
ation. The incentive to organize the party decentrally becomes stronger if the trust
in the capacities of the leader decreases.
Proposition 3 Suppose RF selects the governance structure of the party at the
beginning of period 1. RF is indi¤erent between a centralized and a decentralized
party when G   (1   )B  0. RF strictly prefers a decentralized party when
G  (1  )B < 0.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have compared the incentives of the leader and of the rank-and-le
to replace a member of parliament. The leader replaces the member if this increases
the likelihood of implementing the second period policy. A competent leader there-
fore replaces an incompetent parliamentarian. By contrast, an incompetent leader
replaces a competent parliamentarian and keeps an incompetent one to prevent that
a future policy failure is discovered. It is interesting to note that this result may also
hold in a di¤erent setting. For instance, in a rm an employee who knows that he
has made mistakes may prefer that the evaluation of his tasks is done by someone
who is incompetent.
The selection of a member of parliament has been analyzed in a very stylized
set-up ignoring several elements. Let us discuss some limitations of the model. First
of all, we assumed that the replacement decision is not observed by the public. As
a result, the leader replaces a member if a new member is more likely to support
implementation in the second period. What happens if replacement is observable?
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In that case, the reputation of the leader depends not only on the implementation
decision but also on the replacement decision. This is because the reputation of the
leader increases more if two members each support the implementation of one policy
than if one member supports the implementation of both policies. As a result, there
may be an incentive for an opportunistic leader to replace a member who supports
implementation in the rst period. However, this comes at the cost of being detected
as an opportunist, since an idealistic leader keeps a member who supports imple-
mentation. Moreover, as we have shown, a member who supports implementation
in period 1 is more likely than a new member to support implementation in period
2, irrespective of the quality of the policies. Therefore, with observable replacement
there is still a strong incentive for an opportunistic leader to keep a loyal member
and to replace a critical member of parliament.
Second, we considered members of parliament as truly concerned about the so-
cieties interest. As a result, a member responds to negative information about
the leaders policy. Clearly, a parliamentarian may also have career concerns. A
member of parliament who cares about his position may ignore private information
and vote such that he is not replaced. Selection then not only refers to the ability
of a parliamentarian but also to his motivation. Third, we have abstracted from
electoral competition between di¤erent parties. Elections enable voters to select an
other party with a new leader and a new member of parliament. If the voters do
not observe the replacement decision, our analysis remains una¤ected. The outcome
of the elections then only a¤ects when the replacement decision matters but does
not a¤ect the incentive to replace a member. When replacement is observable, an
idealistic leader may try to signal his motivation through the replacement decision.
For instance, an idealist may keep a critical member if this increases his reelection
chances. Finally, an interesting extension would be to allow the rank-and-le to
replace the leader. The leader may then prefer to select incompetent members to
prevent that a member of parliament becomes the new leader.9 These extensions
are left for further research.
9This relates to the analysis of Friebel and Raith (2004). They show that managers may have
an incentive to select incompetent subordinates when there is a threat that a subordinate takes
over the managers position. Recently, Besley (2005) emphasizes the need for political economists
to examine how political institutions perform in selecting the best citizens for o¢ ce.
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Appendix: Turnover data
We compared the composition of the Dutch parliament a day before and a day
after each election since 1952. To control for electoral uctuations, we calculated
the turnover rate for each party in the following way. Suppose party A obtained
30 seats during an election compared to 25 seats during the last election. In that
case, the maximum number of legislators party A can keep is equal to 25. Then the
percentage of legislative turnover due to party A is described by:
number of new legislators for party A - increase in seats
number of seats before elections

 100%:
For instance, if there are 10 new legislators for party A then the turnover per-




  100% = 20%. Now suppose party A obtains 20 seats, a
decrease compared to the last elections. Then the maximum number of legislators
party A can keep is equal to 20. If there are then 10 new legislators, the turnover
percentage is equal to 10
20
100% = 50%. More generally, the percentage of legislative
turnover due to party A is then described by:

number of new legislators for party A
number of seats after elections

 100%:
Figure 1 shows the turnover rate for each of the three major parties. Figure 2
shows the average turnover rate for each decade.
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We have to proof that always replacing MP1 is a best respond for the RF .
Suppose G  (1  )B < 0. In this case, the replacement decision is only relevant
if s1 = g. Suppose s1 = g. Replacing is optimal if condition (2)  (3). Rewriting
yields that this holds if  [^G+ (1  ^)B]  ^G. Inserting ^ and ^ denoted by (2)
and (3) yields that replacement is optimal if 0  G  (1  )B.
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Suppose G (1 )B  0. Replacement is now only relevant if s1 = b. Suppose
s1 = b. Replacing MP1 yields an expected payo¤ to the RF equal to:
b (s1 = b) + (1  ) 1
2

G  [1  b (s1 = b)] (1  ) 1
2
B
with b (s1 = b) = Pr ( j s1 = b) = " (1  )12
(1  )1
2
+ (1  ) + (1  )1
2
# :
Keeping MP1 yields an expected payo¤ to the RF equal to:




1  b (s1 = b)  ^(s1 = b)i 1
2
B
with b (s1 = b) = Pr ( j s1 = b) = " (1  )
(1  )1
2
+ (1  ) + (1  )1
2
# :
When the leader is competent, MP1 is incompetent. Then y2 is implemented
with probability 1
2
(rst term). WhenMP1 is competent, the leader is incompetent.
In that case, MP1 receives s2 = b and votes v2 = N . Finally, it is also possible that
bothMP1 and the leader are incompetent. Then y2 is implemented with probability
1
2
(second term). Comparing the expected payo¤ if MP1 is replaced and if he is not
replaced yields that replacement is optimal if  [^G+ (1  ^)B]  ^B. Inserting ^
and ^ yields that replacement is optimal if G  (1  )B  0.
Proof. Proposition 2
We have to proof that the leader replaces MP1 if and only if v1 = N . In the
main text, we showed that the replacement decision is redundant if v1 = Y and
G  (1  )B  0 and if G  (1  )B < 0 and v1 = N .
Suppose v1 = Y and G  (1  )B < 0. Suppose the leader is competent. As










=) ^ > ;






> . An opportunistic leader then does not
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=) (^  ) (^vt=Y   ^v1=Y;v2=N)  0:
As showed in the main text, ^vt=Y > ^v1=Y;v2=N = . The reputation of the leader
improves if parliament votes in favor of rather than against y2. Hence, the condition
is always satised. Suppose the leader is incompetent. As v1 = Y , the leader infers















=)  (^vt=Y   ^v1=Y;v2=N)  0:
Suppose v1 = N and G  (1  )B  0. Suppose the leader is competent and







which always hold. Suppose the leader is competent and an opportunist. Then the







(^v1=N;v2=Y   ^vt=N)  0;
which holds. Finally, suppose the leader is incompetent. The opportunistic leader

















=) (^  ) (^v1=N;v2=Y   ^vt=N)  0;
which again holds.
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